Reported / Unreported Judgments

Moreover, it was also established from the evidence on record that Accused No.1 had inflicted knife injury of such a nature, upon the unarmed deceased, that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Hence, we are not inclined to grant the benefit of this Exception clause to Accused No.1 in the present case.

Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the present appeals are devoid of merits, and we find no ground to interfere with the judgment passed by the High Court. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

In our opinion, the arguments which have been put forward in the matter by Mr. D.N. Ray, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2, are much more acceptable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The findings recorded by the High Court are plausible, logical and persuasive, reached by the materials on record and command for affirmation. Thus, we do not have any hesitation to hold that the High Court has correctly come to the conclusions with the reasons given therefor. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in these appeals which are hereby dismissed.

We accordingly allow the Appeals in part. We confirm the judgment of the High Court in so far as it rejects the challenge by the Appellant to the finding of misconduct. However, for the reasons which we have indicated above we direct that the order of dismissal from service shall stand substituted with an order of compulsory retirement which shall take effect from 14 July 2009, the date on which the final order of penalty was imposed upon the Appellant.

In the circumstances, we find the assessment made by the Trial Court as well as the High Court in the present case to be completely correct and justified. We do not see any reason to upset the conclusions and findings recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court. Consequently, affirming the conviction and sentence of A2 Jivraj Badha the appellant herein, we dismiss this Criminal Appeal. He shall serve the sentence awarded to him.

31. Credit Societies against which there is an ‘interim order’ of winding up are temporarily debarred from dispensing agricultural credit, by virtue of the operation of law. The embargo imposed by such interim order may or may not fructify into a final order of winding up. (We have already discussed this aspect of the matter at para 21 supra). On the face of such possibility of the society resuming its activity of “dispensing agricultural credit” - to debar its managing committee members from discharging their statutory obligation under the MARKETS ACT would be productive of public mischief. Such an interpretation of the statute must be avoided.

32. For the above reasons, we do not see any merit in the appeals. Therefore, the appeals are dismissed.

In view of the above, we set aside the impugned order dated 08/09/2011 passed by the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Misc. Application No. 1757 of 2007 with Criminal Misc. Application No. 9158 of 2007. We direct the Chief Judicial Metropolitan Magistrate, Vadodara to dispose of the Criminal Complaint No.6076 of 2006 as expeditiously as possible and, in any event, within a period of one year from the date of receipt of this order.

The special leave petition is dismissed with these observations. We make it clear that nothing said by us in this order shall prejudice either the prosecution or the defence. The observations made by us are relevant only for the disposal of the petition and will not be taken to be the expression of any opinion on the merits of the case pending before the court below.

Petition dismissed.

But whether the case falls under Section 300, thirdly of IPC, is very doubtful. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of defence of the deceased, this Court holds that the case falls under Section 304 Part II and the appellant has already suffered imprisonment for 11 years 2 months. In that view of the matter, this Court holds that the sentence which has already been undergone by the appellant is more than sufficient under Section 304 Part II. However, the sentence of fine is set aside.

Having regard to our finding, that the case falls under Section 304 Part II, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The appellant should be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

It was also contended that the respondent No.1 has suffered damages because the premises No. 21/1/C was not given to Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 1 could not provide more accommodation to admit number of students and suffered loss. She invited our attention to Section 21 of Specific Relief Act, and contended that damages should be granted. This argument is devoid of any merit as we have already held above that Respondent No. 1 has no case to seek specific relief for premises no. 21/1/C, therefore, there is no case made out for damages. Hence, this appeal is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.

We, therefore, set aside the judgment passed by the
Gujarat High Court and answer the appeals arising from the
order of the Bombay High Court; transferred cases and the
writ petitions accordingly. However, we leave it open, so far as
the cellular operators in the Bombay cases are concerned, to
agitate the issue with regard to the retrospective operation of
the assessment/demand of tax and the quantum thereof
before the appropriate forum, if so advised. Consequently,
and in the light of the above all the appeals, writ petitions and
the transferred cases are disposed of.

For the purpose of the conducting enquiries in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the Governor shall by warrant under his hand and seal, appoint a person to be known as Lokpal.

To enable the said exercise to be duly performed, we set aside the order of the High Court impugned in each of the aforesaid civil appeals and remit all the matters to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with the observations and principles of law contained in the present order.

The provisions of Section 6A(1) do indicate that for officers of the level of Joint Secretary and above a kind of immunity has been provided for

The last point which requires consideration is with respect to the period for considering the application, and granting the sanction. There is some merit in the submission of the appellants in this behalf. Such application cannot be kept pending indefinitely, and therefore we would expect the Collector to decide such applications as far as possible within 90 days from the receipt of the application, on the lines of the judgment of this Court in Patel Raghav Natha (supra). In the event the application is not being decided within 90 days, we expect the Collector to record the reasons why the decision is getting belated.

For the reasons stated above we do not find any reason to interfere in the impugned judgment rendered by the Division Bench, approving the decisions rendered by the Single Judges in the Writ Petitions. All appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.

Mode of recruitment - Judicial officers of regular State judicial cadre promoted as FTC Judges - State Government
notification and Rules requiring such FTC Judges to undertake limited competitive examination for promotion/absorption
to Higher Judicial Service cadre - Validity - Held, All India Judges' Assn. (3), (2002) 4 SCC 247 and relevant Rules
contemplate that a person who is to be directly appointed to Higher Judicial Services has to undergo a written
examination and appear in an interview before he can be appointed to the said cadre - Once Rules required a particular
procedure to be adopted for promotion to regular posts of Higher Judicial Services, then competent authority can effect
promotion only by that process and none other - These officers who were promoted as ad hoc FTC Judges had not taken
any written competitive examination before their promotion to this post under Higher Judicial Services - Hence, directive
of State Government, valid, (2012) 6 SCC 502-U

The respondent has not produced any of the agreements by and between the parties. It has also not been shown that any step was taken by it to mitigate the losses. The witness of the respondent, Mr. Samir H. Pathak clearly quantified the damages on the basis of some heads. No evidence has been adduced to probe the actual amount of loss suffered by it.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and for the reasons stated heretobefore, we are of the opinion that both the petitioner and the respondent have failed to prove their respective cases. Both the petition and the counter claim are, therefore, dismissed. The parties shall pay and bear their own costs.

The Press Council on consideration of the records of the case and reports of the Inquiry Committee accepts the reasons, findings and recommendations of the Committee and decides accordingly.

Therefore, privity of contract is with him. It is true that normally such liability with regard to the manufacturing defects is to be borne by the manufacturer. But, that would not mean that the dealer is absolved from joint and several liability. As held in the aforesaid case the District Forum shall ensure execution expeditiously and immediately, if necessary, by making the petitioner to pay initially and, then, it will be for the petitioner to claim reimbursement from the manufacturer (Respondent No.2).

In the result, the Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.